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Abstract: Critical infrastructures like our power generation facilities and water 
supply form highly interconnected networks that are mutually dependent and any 
failure can cascade through the network, resulting in devastating impact on 
health, safety and the economy. These catastrophic events/disruptions can be 
triggered by environmental accidents, geological/weather phenomena, disease 
pandemics, etc. The disruptions can be caused/exacerbated by their being 
unexpected, but they may actually be expected if relevant data have been 
accounted for. To help account for and thereby anticipate such disruptions, one 
way is to identify potential unforeseen interdependencies among infrastructure 
components that can lead to extreme disruptions upon some failure in the 
network. This paper shows how a simulation model for cascading failures and a 
risk analysis/optimization approach can be applied to search for unforeseen 
interdependencies and failure points that give rise to the highest risk in a network. 
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I. Introduction 
 
Critical infrastructure refers to the assets, systems and networks comprising identifiable 
industries, institutions and distribution capabilities that provide a reliable flow of goods and 
services essential to the functioning of the economy, the government at various levels, and 
society as a whole
1
.  Examples of critical infrastructure include facilities for energy/power 
generation, water supply, telecommunications, transportation, banking/financial services, 
security and health services, etc.
2
. They are highly interconnected and mutually dependent in 
complex ways, and the sudden unavailability of any of them or part thereof may cause loss of 
life, severe impact on health, safety or the economy
3,4,5
. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of December 2004, the Hurricane Katrina devastation of the US Gulf Coast in 
2005, the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, the 2011 Tohoku earthquake/tsunami and the severe 
flooding in Thailand late 2011 can be considered examples of such major 
disruptions/disasters. 
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Within a single sector of critical infrastructure (e.g. the electric grid), as well as among 
various mixed-type or multiple-sector infrastructure (e.g. electric grid and water supply), the 
interdependencies among their various components can be highly complex and can be 
quantitative or qualitative in character. Compounding the challenge of analyzing these 
interrelationships is that access to the required information is difficult because a vast majority 
of infrastructure assets are owned by the private sector and there are significant barriers to 
sharing information between the private sector and the government
3
. Furthermore, while 
experts within a particular infrastructure sector may be able to identify the interdependencies 
within that sector to build a concise network model for analysis, it is a challenge to identify 
the interdependencies between different sectors. Interdependencies are most often classified 
into the following five types
6,7
: 
 
• Physical - A physical or engineering reliance between infrastructures, e.g. material 
flow from one infrastructure to another. 
• Information/Cyber - An informational or control requirement between infrastructures, 
e.g. a reliance on information transfer between infrastructures. 
• Geospatial/Geographical - A relationship that exists entirely because of the proximity 
of infrastructures, e.g. a local environmental event affects components across multiple 
infrastructures due to physical proximity. 
• Policy/Procedural - An interdependency that exists due to policy or procedure that 
relates a state or event change in one infrastructure sector to a subsequent effect on 
another sector, e.g. government’s emergency mandatory orders on a particular area 
due to the influence of an event. 
• Societal/Logical - An interdependency that an infrastructure event may have on 
societal factors, e.g. public opinion, public confidence, fear, and culture issues. 
 
The challenging problem of modelling the relationship/network models of these complex 
systems have motivated much research
8,9
. However, even if accurate models were built, it is 
unclear if the far-reaching consequences of the 9/11 terrorist attacks or the 2011 Tohoku 
earthquake/tsunami could have been anticipated. Very often, some interdependencies are 
explicitly revealed only after the disasters or disruptions occur.  For example, the Tohoku 
disaster left over twenty thousand confirmed dead, injured or missing, and millions more 
affected by lack of electricity, water and transportation
10
. Extensive agriculture landscape 
was flooded, train stations and railway network were damaged, a dam failed in operation, fire 
occurred at an oil refinery plant, electricity transmission lines, ship and crane, highway 
bridges were damaged, and a level-7 nuclear accident happened at the Fukushima nuclear 
power plant
11
. Also affected were the interrelated supply chain business networks between 
Japan and other countries. To cooperate with electricity conservation efforts, many factories 
producing high technology components stopped production lines to support blackout 
measures. 
 
The idea that such high impact but highly unexpected events could actually have been 
expected if the relevant available data had been accounted for was put forth by Taleb
12
 in his 
book “The Black Swan”. Black Swan events are highly improbable events (outliers), and 
highly impactful, and can be caused and exacerbated by their being unexpected.  However, in 
spite of being highly unexpected, it is natural that experts (and even casual observers) will 
retrospectively be able to construct explanations for their occurrence after they have 
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occurred, making them explainable and expected.  In the context of critical infrastructure, this 
is similar to the interdependencies that are explicitly revealed only after major disruptions.  
As an example used by Taleb, the 9/11 attacks was an event that was a surprise to many 
observers with major impact/effects felt up to today on the heightened level of security and 
pre-emptive strikes against various parties. It is doubtful if any amount of modelling and 
analysis could have predicted how terrorist attacks on some commercial infrastructure could 
have led to the consequential shutdown of air-space, disruption of air travel around the world 
and the ensuing conflicts. It seems to imply how little our understanding of the complex 
systems in our society and physical world can help us guess what is going to happen next, 
and this Black Swan logic actually makes what we don’t know far more relevant than what 
we do know. 
 
Since it is a challenge to construct an accurate model of the network of critical 
infrastructure interdependencies/relationships and, anyway, our current limited awareness of 
the relationships may not be helpful to predict the highly improbable and high impact 
disruptions, it may be futile to go on to perform the required analyses on such models to 
predict the effects of those major disruptions. Hence, instead of analyzing a given 
infrastructure network to determine the effects of any failure, the overall aim should perhaps 
be to solve the inverse problem, i.e. to synthesize the network that will result in the most 
extreme disruptions due to some failure. This can be achieved by beginning with the set of 
infrastructure components, their known interdependencies and prescribed initial/boundary 
conditions and failure modes, and then apply optimization techniques to iteratively 
vary/modify the network with additional (unforeseen) interdependencies until the disruption 
effects are maximized.  In this way, what is obtained will be a set of network models (with 
their associated interdependencies) that can potentially be realized in our real world and that 
will result in the most severe disruption effects due to various failures with associated 
probabilities. The resulting networks obtained can then be reviewed by a diverse team of 
experts to interpret the unforeseen interdependencies and potential scenarios that may lead to 
the realization of the disruptions computed for the network. As both the severity/impact of 
the disruptions and the probabilities of occurrence will both be computed as the criteria for 
the optimization, this represents a risk analysis approach of describing the problem and also a 
multiobjective optimization problem. Based on these ideas, this paper presents one way to 
investigate how the highly unexpected major disruptions (the Black Swan events) in our 
critical infrastructure systems can be anticipated by solving the inverse (optimization) 
problem of synthesizing infrastructure network interdependency models for extreme failure 
impact and probabilities. By investigating how the inverse problem can be formulated, the 
study in turn also explores the bounds (limits) of these extreme (catastrophic) disruptions that 
can arise from the interdependencies inherent in our critical infrastructures. 
 
II. Optimization and Analysis of Infrastructure Network Disruptions 
 
The network model of critical infrastructures comprises the infrastructure 
assets/components (nodes) and the links representing their interdependencies, as illustrated in 
Figure 1(a) (for only three infrastructure sectors). 
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The study of the critical infrastructure vulnerabilities is based on a risk analysis 
framework, where risk can be defined as risk = f (probability, impact), i.e. as a function of the 
probability of a failure/hazard/threat resulting in an adverse event and the severity/impact of 
that event
13,14,15,16
. In the context of our problem, impact refers to the magnitude of the 
disruption in the network computed according to various metrics used in network theory such 
as, e.g. the giant component size
17,18
, using agent-based simulation
19,20,21,22
. Probability refers 
to the probability of the failures propagating/leading to the disruption. The optimization 
problem is therefore a problem of searching for networks and failures that maximize the two 
objectives of probability and disruption, with the decision variables being the unforeseen 
(variable) interdependencies and failure points within the network.  With two objectives, an 
evolutionary algorithm
23,24
 is used to iterate a population of solutions (i.e. a set of networks 
with corresponding failures) converging towards Pareto-optimality. In this way, optimization 
has been used to synthesize networks with the highest risk, while those with the extreme 
disruption impact can be considered the Black Swan events, as summarized in Figure 1(b). 
 
III. Results from Experimental Case Study 
 
The proposed methodology was applied to an experimental case study with a network 
comprising 43 nodes with two variable (unforeseen) interdependencies added to the fixed 
(known) interdependencies. The results show that unforeseen interdependencies can indeed 
exacerbate the disruption consequences/impact, where impact is quantified by the giant 
component size (the smaller the size, the greater the impact). The plot in Figure 2(a) shows 
the optimal solution points obtained, with a line drawn through the Pareto-optimal solutions 
to represent the Pareto-front. The point at the lower extreme left is the Pareto-optimal 
solution with the greatest disruption (giant component size of 0.1), hence it can be interpreted 
as a Black Swan event, and it represents the scenario where failure occurs at node 30 and 
            
(a)                                                             (b) 
Figure 1. (a) Critical infrastructure network model (b) Pareto optimal solutions of the 
multiobjective evolutionary optimization problem, with network solutions of extreme 
disruption representing Black Swan events. 
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where there are two unforeseen interdependencies as shown by the thick black lines added to 
the network in Figure 2(b). 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
 
By assuming that a significant part of the network interdependencies is in fact unknown 
(unforeseen), the proposed approach applies optimization to search for unknown 
interdependencies and failure points that will cause extreme events, thus leading analysts on a 
focused exploration of ‘what-if’ scenarios of high disruptive impact. In addition, it provides 
policymakers with a way to analyse the ‘trade-off’ between the high-probability/low-impact 
and the low-probability/high-impact events. 
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